Note: I do not maintain this list here anymore, so the below list is only for archival purposes. For my full and current publication list, please go to:
ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8524-5282
Program committees/chair
General Chair: CHERITech (2024), CARDIS (2022)
Technical Program Committee: USENIX Security (2025-2026), ACM CCS 2022-2025), TCHES (2017 and 2021-2022 and 2025), DATE (2015-2018 and 2024-2025), ASHES (2019-2024), SysTEX (2024), FDTC (2013-2025), Crypto (2023), CARDIS (2013-2014, 2021, 2023), escar USA (2017-2023), IndoCrypt (2022), CYSARM (2019-2021), Kangacrypt (2018), RFIDSec (2016)
Notable publications
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks Against Intel SGX
Authors: K. Murdock, D. Oswald, F. D. Garcia, J. Van Bulck, D. Gruss, F. Piessens
This paper introduces Plundervolt, a software-only fault injection attack against Intel SGX. By manipulating the CPU’s undervolting interface via Model Specific Registers (MSRs), a privileged adversary can inject faults during enclave execution, breaking integrity and recovering secrets (e.g. from AES, RSA).
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PLATYPUS: Software-based Power Side-Channel Attacks on x86
Authors: M. Lipp, A. Kogler, D. Oswald, M. Schwarz, C. Easdon, C. Canella, D. Gruss
PLATYPUS demonstrates how unprivileged access to Intel’s RAPL (Running Average Power Limit) interface can be exploited as a low-resolution power side channel on x86. We show that differences in power consumption can reveal instruction-level operations, leak cryptographic keys (even inside SGX), and break mitigations such as KASLR.
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Lock It and Still Lose It — On the (In)Security of Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems
Authors: F. D. Garcia, D. Oswald, T. Kasper, P. Pavlidès
This USENIX Security paper uncovers serious vulnerabilities in automotive remote keyless entry (RKE) systems. Through reverse engineering and cryptanalysis, we show how many vehicle systems reuse global keys or weak rolling-code schemes. We present practical attacks to clone remotes or recover keys with minimal data, affecting millions of cars.
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Breaking Mifare Desfire MF3ICD40: Power Analysis and Templates in the Real World
Authors: D. Oswald, C. Paar
This CHES 2011 paper presents a practical and powerful side-channel attack on the Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40 contactless smartcard. Using power analysis and template attacks, we recover 3DES keys from production cards, challenging the security assumptions of embedded devices.
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A Tale of Two Worlds: Assessing the Vulnerability of Enclave Shielding Runtimes
Authors: J. Van Bulck, D. Oswald, E. Marin, A. Aldoseri, F. D. Garcia, F. Piessens
This CCS 2019 work examines how enclave shielding runtimes (middleware between untrusted OS and secure enclave) can introduce vulnerabilities. We find that sanitization and interface boundaries are often misdesigned, leading to memory safety or side-channel flaws. We reveal real exploits and show that many shielding frameworks were insecure at the time.
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